CSB: Chemical Facilities Should Assess Remote Isolation of Process Equipment Now

The US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is calling on chemical facilities to implement greater use of remote isolation for major process equipment. 

In a recent study titled “Remote Isolation of Process Equipment,” the Board issued recommendations to key regulators and groups—US EPA, OSHA, and the American Petroleum Institute (API) for more and clearer regulation and guidance concerning use of remote isolation equipment at chemical facilities. 

Should chemical facilities apply remote isolation to major process equipment before Federal regulations or industry consensus standards require them to do so? 

The Board’s safety study claims industry has not fully recognized that effective remote isolation of process equipment is critical to stopping releases of hazardous materials. Remote isolation can also help prevent fatalities and serious injuries, limit damage, and better protect communities and the environment.

Three Safety Recommendations

CSB is issuing three safety recommendations via its new Safety Study: one to the American Petroleum Institute (API), one to US EPA, and one to OSHA.

American Petroleum Institute (API). The CSB recommends that the American Petroleum Institute revise its industry guidance documents to apply to more facility types beyond refineries and include criteria for when remote isolation devices should be required that may be automatically activated or remotely activated from a safe location, for processes involving highly flammable or toxic materials and atmospheric storage tanks.

US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The CSB recommends that the US Environmental Protection Agency incorporate requirements for an evaluation of the need for remote isolation capabilities into its Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule, which regulates processes involving highly flammable or toxic materials.

US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The CSB recommends that the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration include requirements for an evaluation of the need for remote isolation capabilities into its Process Safety Management (PSM) standard, which regulates processes involving highly hazardous chemicals.

Hazmat Releases and Remote Isolation of Process Equipment

Loss of containment due to the lack of remote isolation equipment escalated the severity of numerous chemical incidents since 2005, CSB shows. This study highlights several incident investigations:

Formosa Plastics Propylene Explosion (2005)

• Injured sixteen workers.
• Heavily damaged the process unit.
• Evacuation of a nearby school.

Valero McKee Refinery Propane Fire (2007)

• Injured four workers.
• Evacuation of the refinery.
• Several-month shutdown of the refinery.

Intercontinental Terminals Company (ITC) Tank Fire (2019)

• Damaged property in excess of $150 million.
• Released twenty-one million gallons of hazard material and contaminated water into nearby waterways.
• Issuance of shelter-in-place orders due to benzene-related air quality concerns.
• Closure of local schools and businesses.

KMCO Fatal Fire and Explosion (2019)

• Injured two and killed one.
• Heavily damaged portions of the facility.
• Shook nearby homes, per reports.

PES Refinery Fire and Explosions (2019)

• Released about 676,000 pounds of hydrocarbons.
• Released over 5,200 pounds of highly toxic hydrofluoric acid.
• Damaged property up to $750 million.
• Permanent closure of the refinery.

TPC Group Port Neches Explosion and Fire (2019)

• Felt up to thirty miles away, per reports.
• Caused $450 million in on-site property damage.
• Caused $153 million in off-site property damage to nearby homes and businesses.
• Propelled a process tower at the facility into the air.
• Resulted in a month-plus-long fire within the facility.

Tags: Chemical safety, CSB